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Fair. Item in acceptable condition including possible liquid damage. As well answers may be filled in. May be missing DVDs, CDs, Access code, etc. 100%Money-Back Guarantee! Ship within 24 hours! !
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Seller's Description:
Good. 138, wraps, illus., footnotes, notes, bibliography, index, red underlining on p. 105, ink mark on p. xiii. Foreword by Eugene V. Rostow. Hoover International Studies, Hoover Institution Publication 208.
Publisher:
Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University
Published:
1979
Language:
English
Alibris ID:
17602475412
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Seller's Description:
Good. xv, 138 pages. Notes. Bibliography. Index. No dust jacket as issued. Joseph Douglass, Jr., Ph.D. was an author, teacher and internationally recognized authority on U.S. -Soviet relations and subsequent geopolitical strategies and conflicts. During his career, Dr. Douglass was sought out for his research, knowledge and expertise on the strategies and tactics of the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War and also for his interviews revealing facts about the fate of thousands U.S. military personnel listed as missing in action and prisoners of war during World War II and the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. Dr. Douglas taught at Cornell as well as The Johns Hopkins University, and the Navy Postgraduate School. He also worked at the Advanced Research Projects Agency. Dr. Douglass was best known for two books that he wrote following a long debriefing of Mr. Jan Sejna, the highest-ranking Communist defector to the United States. Those books, Red Cocaine, the Drugging of America, and Betrayed, the story of MIAs and POWs from several U.S. wars, are considered by some experts to contain breakthrough information on international drug strategies and the illegal detention and experimentation on MIAs and POWs based on evidence gained from interviews. Other books include Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War Soviet Military Strategy in Europe, Conventional War and Escalation: The Soviet View, Decision-Making in Communist Countries, Why the Soviets Violate Arms Control Treaties, and The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive. Amoretta M. Hoeber is an experienced authority with a demonstrated history of working successfully in the Defense and National Security communities. She has technical expertise in nuclear, chemical and biological defense. She is killed in Crisis Management, Government Procurement, Emergency Management, Intelligence, and Operational Planning. She is a former Deputy Under Secretary of the U.S. Army. Foreword by Eugene V. Rostow. This is one of the Hoover International Studies (Richard F. Staar, general editor). What the Douglass-Hoeber study reveals is how the Soviet Union is using and planning to use its growing military power, both convention and strategic, as an instrument of imperial expansion. Includes chapters on the Soviet view of nuclear war, Soviet warfighting objectives, phases of the war in Soviet military thought, and strategic force targeting and employment strategy. The following is derived from a 2016 review by Angelo M. Codevilla published by the Hoover Institution: The Soviet view of nuclear war has never been readily available to American audiences. The Soviet military expressed its thoughts on the subject in voluminous professional literature. Most of it was classified. Few American researchers possessed the language skills and the inclination to sort through it. This book, now rare, is one of the few that presented the Soviet viewpoint in its own terms. The Soviet military lived in an intellectual/moral world substantially different from that of the Americans. Reading their writings, one is impressed by their high professional self-regard. They were the heirs of Napoleon's key insight: massive concentrations of artillery at the point of attack. These men had torn apart the Wehrmacht in no small measure by superior concentrations of firepower at key times and places. Whoever might speculate on how the Soviets might have fought a nuclear war could do worse than to study the opening phase of the Soviet 1944 Vistula/Oder offensive and imagining the substitution of nuclear for conventional explosives.
