Using the example of great modern leaders - Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben Gurion - all of whom were without military experience, Supreme Command argues that, in fact, civilian statesman can be brilliant commanders in times of war. Supreme Command is about leadership in wartime, or more precisely about the tension between two kinds of leadership, civil and military. Eliot Cohen uncovers the nature of strategy-making by looking at four great democratic war statesman and seeing how they dealt with the military leaders ...
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Using the example of great modern leaders - Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben Gurion - all of whom were without military experience, Supreme Command argues that, in fact, civilian statesman can be brilliant commanders in times of war. Supreme Command is about leadership in wartime, or more precisely about the tension between two kinds of leadership, civil and military. Eliot Cohen uncovers the nature of strategy-making by looking at four great democratic war statesman and seeing how they dealt with the military leaders who served them. In doing so he reveals fundamental aspects of leadership and provides not merely an historical analysis but a study of issues that remain crucial today. By examining the cases of four of the greatest war statesmen of the twentieth century he explores the problem of how people confront the greatest challenges that can befall them, in this case national leaders. Beginning with a discussion of civil-military relations from a theoretical point of view, Cohen lays out the conventional beliefs about how politicians should deal with generals and the extent to which either can influence the outcome of war. From these he draws broader lessons for students of leadership generally.
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Seller's Description:
Good. Minimal signs of wear. Corners and cover may show wear. May contain highlighting and or writing. May be missing dust jacket. May not include supplemental materials. May be a former library book.
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Book is in good condition. Minimal signs of wear. It May have markings or highlights but kept to only a few pages. May not come with supplemental materials if applicable.
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Fair. The item is very worn but continues to work perfectly. Signs of wear can include aesthetic issues such as scratches, dents, worn and creased covers, folded page corners and minor liquid stains. All pages and the cover are intact, but the dust cover may be missing. Pages may include moderate to heavy amount of notes and highlighting, but the text is not obscured or unreadable. Page edges may have foxing (age related spots and browning). May NOT include discs, access code or other supplemental materials.
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Very good. Connecting readers with great books since 1972! Used books may not include companion materials, and may have some shelf wear or limited writing. We ship orders daily and Customer Service is our top priority!
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Very good, very good. 288, appendix, notes, index, slight wear and soiling to DJ. In this controversial book which topped President George W. Bush's reading list, Cohen challenges the long-held belief that politicians should step aside and leave the business of war to the military. The author uses the examples of great modern leaders--Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, and Ben Gurion--all of whom were without military experience. This is an unconventional examination of the conundrum of wartime leadership, namely who should be in charge, the president or the general.
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Very good in Very good jacket. xiv, 288, [2] pages. Inscribed and dated by the author on the front free endpaper. Inscription reads: Washington, DC, 13 June 2002. To Chuck Lane, With every best wish--Eliot A. Cohen. The book includes Preface, Acknowledgments, Notes, and Index. Chapters include The Soldier and the Statesman, Lincoln Sends a Letter, Clemenceau Pays a Visit, Churchill Asks a Question, Ben-Gurion Holds a Seminar, Leadership without Genius; The Unequal Dialogue, and an appendix on The Theory of Civilian Control. Eliot Asher Cohen (born April 3, 1956 in Boston, Massachusetts) is an American political scientist. He was a counselor in the United States Department of State under Condoleezza Rice from 2007 to 2009. In 2019, Cohen was named the 9th Dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University, succeeding the former dean, Vali Nasr. Before his time as dean, he directed the Strategic Studies Program at SAIS. Cohen "is one of the few teachers in the American academy to treat military history as a serious field", according to international law scholar Ruth Wedgwood. Cohen is a contributing writer at The Atlantic. In this book, Eliot Cohen examines four great democratic war statesmen--Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion--to reveal the surprising answer to the question of who should run the show, especially in times of war: the politicians. The generals may think they know how to win, but the statesmen are the ones who see the big picture. Derived from a Kirkus review: Strategy analyst Cohen challenges the view that wars are best fought by military technicians without civilian interference. Those who maintain that Vietnam would have been an American victory if only U. S. generals had not had their hands tied by desk jockeys back home will doubtless take issue with Cohen's thesis, which argues that inflexible military professionalism was one factor in America's defeat. Reinforcing (but also qualifying) the adage "War is too important to be left to the generals, " Cohen examines the history of military campaigns in which democratic governments managed their generals in the field. Among the most successful was Abraham Lincoln's constant intervention in Union military strategy; rather than concentrate on capturing the Confederate capital of Richmond, as his generals wished, Lincoln insisted that the war be fought on the periphery of the South, steadily weakening the enemy by attrition. Cohen effectively demonstrates that the president "exercised a constant oversight of the war effort from beginning to end." So did French leader Georges Clemenceau, who secured victory in WWI by balancing the competing demands of two very different generals, Pétain and Foch, and of independent-minded allies. So too did Israeli premier David Ben-Gurion, a gifted student of history who introduced civilian control (and guerrilla tactics) into the new nation's army, making it something of an "organizational anomaly, " but a remarkably effective one. Although he appreciates professionalism and warns of the dangers of civilians without military experience being given too much managerial authority over affairs in the field, Cohen clearly endorses the idea of civilian control over those whose mission is to kill people and break things. Timely and provocative reading in a era of drum-beating.
