How do civilians control the military? In the wake of September 11, the renewed presence of national security in everyday life has made this question all the more pressing. In this book, Peter Feaver proposes an ambitious new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the "armed servants" of the nationstate. Military obedience is not automatic but depends on strategic calculations of whether civilians will catch and ...
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How do civilians control the military? In the wake of September 11, the renewed presence of national security in everyday life has made this question all the more pressing. In this book, Peter Feaver proposes an ambitious new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the "armed servants" of the nationstate. Military obedience is not automatic but depends on strategic calculations of whether civilians will catch and punish misbehavior.
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Seller's Description:
As New in As New jacket. This book proposes a new theory of civil-military relations in which the connection is conceived as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive directing and monitoring the actions of the military agents, the armed servants of the nation-state; military obedience is not automatic, but depends on the calculations of both parties (dark gray cloth with silver lettering; tan pictorial dust jacket; a bright, clean, tight copy)
