Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower

Time for a Second Chance After Dubya?

Brzezinski has written a concise analysis of the foreign policies of the last three presidents. The titles of the Chapters provide an insight into his views of each. For George H.W. Bush (Bush I) the chapter is titled ?The Original Sin,? for Clinton it is ?The Impotence of Good Intentions,? and for George W. Bush (Bush II) it is ?Catastrophic Leadership.? In each chapter on each president Brzezinski provides a chronology to provide an idea of what president up against in the rest of the world. One fault is he doesn?t discuss the control of Congress very much. During Bush I there was general bi-partisanship. The Republican Congress elected in 1994 seemed to have it in for Clinton which made it difficult, if not nearly impossible for the President to get his way. Unfortunately, the Congress elected in 2000, along with Bush II, provided a rubber stamp and no oversight for six years the Republicans maintained control.

He starts his book comparing the Imperial Hubris of Britain and the Boer Wars with the current administrations imperial hubris. A comparison of Bush I and Napoleon is given as ?proclaiming that America?s historical mission (and his own) is to spur the transformation of no less than the culture and politics of the entire world of Islam.?
Brzezinski takes on Reagan idolaters by noting the Cold War was won because of the actions of all the Presidents and several other world leaders and events since World War II, not just Ronald Reagan. It is Neocon revisionist history with its cherry picking and misinterpreting of events that led to the view Reagan single-handedly brought down the Soviet Empire.
On a few occasions he gives single sentence comparisons of the three Presidents. Early in the book he says ?[Bush I] sought to pursue a traditional policy in a non-traditional environment while America?s two competing worldviews were still crystallizing. [Clinton] embraced a mythologized version of globalization in charge of mankind?s destiny. [Bush II] pursued a militant commitment to prevail in a world dogmatically conceived as polarized between good and evil.
Bush I appropriated Gorbachev?s ?New World Order? phrase according to the author. He
really admires Bush I?s handling of the breakup of the Soviet empire but noted he was caught unawares by the Yugoslav Crisis and had a passive stance toward Afghanistan. In a connection to the current administration Brzezinski states that Bush I?s encouraging of Shi?ite rebellions in 1991 complicates Iraq now.
Unlike Bush I, Clinton had a global vision. Foreign policy was an extension of domestic policy. Consequently there was no one dominant voice on foreign policy. However, the newly established National Economic Council had a central voice. Appropriately, one of the connections to the current situation has a domestic aspect. Brzezinski states, ?[t]he paradox of an objectively secure and might America, victorious in the Cold War, searching for global demons to justify its subjective insecurity crated fertile soil for the fears that became so pervasive after 9/11.? Yet the author also notes: ?American power was not only seen as unquestionably dominant but also legitimate and America?s voice was credible.? Brzezinski says for that, Clinton deserves credit. Domestically, ?[Clinton?s] economic and financial stewardship transformed the ominously escalating budget deficits of earlier administrations into large surpluses.?
On the first page of the Chapter Catastrophic Leadership (and the politics of fear) Brzezinski sets the tone for the rest of the chapter. ?Neither the tactical realism of Global Leader I (Bush I) nor the self indulgent optimism of Global Leader II (Clinton) could save America from destruction at the hands of its mortal enemies. ?[Bush II] saw himself bring ?firm resolve and clear vision and a deep faith? to the new global confrontation between good and evil?.? He ties the two Bush administrations together by noting the strategy that emerged (from 9/11) was a blend of the more imperial formulation of the 1991 draft national security document prepared by DOD officials in the Bush I administration and the militant notions of the Neocon world view.
A damning indictment is given: ?The blend of neocon Manichaeism and President Bush?s propensity for catastrophic decisiveness caused the post 9/11 global solidarity with America to plunge from its historical zenith to its nadir. . . . He continues by noting ?the endless war on terror thus became a domestic political tool as much as a foreign policy.?
Brzezinski brings Reagan into the current situation by noting that ?America?s plunge into Iraq transformed the lingering crisis in the Middle East?allowed to fester under Reagan, Bush I and Clinton?from a chronic problem into a make or break challenge.?
Among the missteps Bush II has made, so far, is ostracizing Iran in the early years of his administration (and continuing to do so) strengthened fundamentalist elements in the Iranian regime. He also made errors in dealing with Russia, China and pretty much the rest of the world. Many will agree with Brzezinski?s conclusion that ?[i]n just five years George W. Bush dangerously undermined America?s geopolitical position.?
Brzezinski?s concluding chapter, Beyond 2008 (and America?s Second Chance), is a conclusion. He provides another one sentence of how each defined his own historical essence. Bush I was the policeman, relying on power and legitimacy to preserve traditional stability. Clinton was the social welfare advocate, counting on globalization to generate progress. Bush II was the vigilante, mobilizing domestic fears to pursue a self-declared existential war against the forces of evil. He goes on to note the general mistake of each: the first did not seize the opportunity offered to America, the second was too complacent in addressing it and the third turned the opportunity into a self-inflicted festering wound while precipitating rising global hostility toward America.
To give America a second chance the author has a few suggestions. He calls for a more active and formalized consultation between executive and legislative branches. He asks for stricter lobbying laws because much of the fragmentation of foreign policy is due to lobbies. As a conclusion the author says: ?Only by identifying itself with the idea of universal human dignity?with its basic requirement of respect for culturally diverse political, social and religious emanations ? can America overcome the risk that the global political awakening will turn against it.?
One of the Figures in this book is a Global Leadership: A Presidential Report Card. Though I heartily agree with the F rating for Bush II, I do not think he rated Clinton high enough and he perhaps gave Bush I too high a grade.