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Seller's Description:
Good. No jacket. Minor shelf wear to extremities. Faint marks on boards. Light tanning and foxing. Contents all clear. 401 p. Contains: Illustrations. Russia and the Allies, 1917-1920, 2.
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Seller's Description:
Very Good in Very Good dust jacket. 0415003717. 401 pages. With maps and plates. Former owner's name on front free endpaper. Occasional annotation or underlining in pencil. Slight wear to spine, covers, corners & dustjacket.; Hardback; Octavo (standard book size); The Road to Intervention. March-November 1918By the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (with which the first volume in this series ended), Russia went out of the Great War. For the Western Allies, convinced that a huge German offensive in France was imminent, the unthinkable had happened. The Eastern Front had finally been closed down. They had a fortnight to consider their new plight. On March 21st, the German offensive, designed to win the war, opened in France. From then on, as the huge battle swayed to and fro, Allied leaders, under immense pressure, had to take major decisions on Russian policy, with desperately tired minds. This is the context in which the Allied, and especially the British road to intervention in Russia must be judged. British policy was surprisingly coherent. Their overriding concern, in their attempt to re-open the Eastern Front, was the critical lack of manpower. The Japanese alone were in a position to intervene in Siberia in force, but only with American consent. Thus the key to intervention lay in Washington. If this period does not reflect well on any of the Allies, it is perhaps least creditable to the American Government. Rightly considering real intervention not to be a practical military proposition, President Wilson dithered as ever more pressing demands arrived from London. The joint American-Japanese force that he finally allowed to be sent was too small and too late. Its final arrival virtually coincided with the final breaking of German military power on the Western Front. Had British plans been adopted, decisive Allied intervention might have occurred six to eight weeks earlier. Michael Kettle has had access to British Government papers never before seen by historians, which reveal how this might have come about. Whilst the Germans dealt directly with the new Bolshevik Government in Moscow, they as openly supported the Don Cossacks in South Russia, ready to take over if the Bolsheviks collapsed. Trotsky, anxious to play off the British against the Germans, thus approved British plans to make use of the Czech Legion, then on its way out of Russia, to save the north Russian ports from the Germans, and for the Russian Fleets to be sabotaged to prevent German seizure. (In fact, the British. Were really thinking of using the Czechs to start up intervention). In mid-May, when President Wilson had finally rejected all British proposals for using Japan in the Far East, the War Cabinet in London decided (because of a crucial change in German policy in Russia) that they must now force the issue, and use the Czechs to start off intervention, without Trotsky+s consent. Trotsky, aware that he had nearly been drawn into an Allied trap, hastily drew back. He denounced the Czech Legion, causing them to revolt against the Bolsheviks. In the fearful confusion of the moment, this was not known in the Allied capitals for some weeks; and when it was, it was initially misunderstood. By a supreme irony, virtually as the Czech revolt took place, the French forbad the British use of +their+ Czechs (the French claimed nominal control over the Czech Legion) to force President Wilson+s hand, arguing that it would prove fatal to obtaining his agreement to real intervention. There was an angry lull. Six weeks later (by when news of the Czech revolt had been assimilated in Washington), President Wilson finally agreed to limited intervention-solely because of the Czechs. Some twenty five years ago, Professor Richard H. Ullman wrote a trilogy on Anglo-Soviet relations during this period. In his first volume: +Intervention and the War+, Ullman relied mainly on the papers of Lord Milner (Secretary of State for War in 1918). In his preface, he wrote: +I am convinced that when British archives...
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Seller's Description:
Very Good in Very Good jacket. Text is unmarked; pages are bright. Remainder stamp on the bottom edge of the pages. Binding is tight and square. Dust jacket shows a little light edgewear. 401pp.
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Seller's Description:
Very Good. Routledge; New York, 1992. Hardcover. Volume 2. A Very Good, black binding with silver lettering on spine, binding firm, some handling/smudge marks to text block edges, some wear bottom spine edge, interior very clean, bookstore sticker bottom front pastedown else unmarked, in a Very Good, trace handling/scuff marks to panels, bit of edge/corner wear, Mylar protected, Dust Wrapper. A nice and clean copy. 8vo[octavo or approx. 6 x 9 inches]. 401pp., indexed, sources, bibliography, b&w illustrations. We pack securely and ship daily with delivery confirmation on every book. The picture on the listing page is of the actual book for sale. Additional Scan(s) are available for any item, please inquire.
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Seller's Description:
Very Good-in Very Good dust jacket; A few spots of hilighting first 50 pages. Some foxing top edge text block. 0415003717. Volume 2 of Russia and the Allies, 1917-1920. Scarce! ; 8vo; 401 pages.
