In this book the author traces the origins of the domestic Swedish guided missile development effort, and shows how an effective Swedish air defense presupposed the consent to American hegemony. The hegemonic cooperation was established through a series of crucial decisions made by the Swedish government to tacitly give its consent to American hegemony in European and world affairs. This process started in 1948 with the Swedish participation in the Marshall Plan and can be considered to have been finalized in 1952 when ...
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In this book the author traces the origins of the domestic Swedish guided missile development effort, and shows how an effective Swedish air defense presupposed the consent to American hegemony. The hegemonic cooperation was established through a series of crucial decisions made by the Swedish government to tacitly give its consent to American hegemony in European and world affairs. This process started in 1948 with the Swedish participation in the Marshall Plan and can be considered to have been finalized in 1952 when President Truman made Sweden eligible for reimbursable armaments deliveries from the United States. In 1959 Sweden purchased the Sidewinder Guided Missile from the United States. This was the confirmation of the fact that Sweden had become a trusted and close ally of the U.S. in the Cold War in Europe. But in order to become eligible for purchasing American military technology, Sweden had to consent to American hegemony. The focus of the study is the effort to develop Swedish-made guided missiles for the Swedish Army and Air Force 1945-1962. These efforts were stymied by the lack of funding and know-how, and therefore. The author concludes that Swedish cooperation with the United States during the Cold War cannot be viewed as a series of exceptions to the rule of the policy of neutrality, but that hegemonic theory permits the display of sovereignty that Sweden's policy gave expression to. The Swedish consent to American hegemony was constant throughout the period studied, just as the American acceptance of Swedish foreign policy behavior and its recognition of Sweden as an ally in the Cold War. The reason for denying Sweden access to guided missiles had nothing to do withAmerican apprehensions regarding the policy of neutrality, but with the U.S. government's lack of trust in its allies overall - including the NATO countries. Likewise, the decision to finally release these missiles to Sweden had to do with American concerns for the credibility of its leadership in the eyes of its European allies. Mikael Nilsson, b. 1976, is a researcher at the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm, Sweden. He has previously published articles on Swedish Security Policy during the Cold War in international publications.
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