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Good in Very good jacket. vii, [1], 213, [1] pages. Chronological Table. Notes and References. Select Bibliography. Index. Substantial ink underlining and marks noted. This is one of The Making of the Twentieth Century series. Dominic Lieven (born 19 January 1952) is a research professor at Cambridge University (Senior Research Fellow, Trinity College) and a Fellow of the British Academy and of Trinity College, Cambridge. Lieven was educated at Downside School, a Benedictine Roman Catholic boarding independent school in Stratton-on-the-Fosse, near Shepton Mallet in Somerset, followed by Christ's College, Cambridge, where he graduated top of the class of 1973 (Double First with Distinction), and was a Kennedy Scholar at Harvard University in 1973/4. Lieven is a writer on Russian history, on empires and emperors, on the Napoleonic era and the First World War, and on European aristocracy. Lieven is on the Editorial Board of Journal of Intelligence and Terrorism Studies[4]. He was elected in 2001 Fellow of the British Academy, and was head of the History Department at the London School of Economics from 2009 to 2011; he was appointed lecturer there in 1978, and professor in 1993. He was appointed to his current position at the University of Cambridge in 2011. From the author's Introduction: By using both archival sources and published Soviet material inaccessible to all but Russian-speaking specialists I hope to add something to our understanding even of this well-trodden field. Chapters 2 and 5, together with a small section of Chapter 1, are devoted to what one might described as the traditional field of the diplomatic origins of the war looked at from a Russian viewpoint. These chapters tackle their theme chronologically. About two-thirds of the book travels outside the realm of traditional diplomatic history. One reason why is can afford to do so is that the English-speaking reader can already find a number of excellent works which will provide him with detailed descriptions of the diplomatic crises of 1904-1914. Nevertheless, the main reason for devoting so mach space to a study of themes outside the usual range of diplomatic history is that these elements often underlay and explained the manoeuvrings of the European chancelleries. This is to some extent self-evidence. It would only be partly wrong to write the history of international relations before 1914 as if it were the product not of human will but of the movement of impersonal factors of power. Geography and geopolitics also help explain states' policies. One aim of this book is to provide a Russian perspective on the all-Europen problem of the relationship of external to internal policy. Another aim is to see to what extend the Russian system of government influenced the goals and methods of the state's foreign policy in the decade prior to 1914. Chapter 1 of this book sets out Russia's position in the hierarchy of the Great Powers and illustrates the constraints which geography and economics, together with the nature and ideology of the Old Regime, put on Russian foreign policy. Chapter 2 looks at Russia's parts in the diplomatic history of the First World War's origins. Chapter 3 establishes which individuals and groups played important roles in Russian foreign and defense policy. Chapter 4 studies the views and nature of these key actors. The sections on P. N. Durnovo and Prince G. N. Trubetskoy, who put the case for: deflecting" or deterring Germany with the greatest clarity and force, go to the root of Russia's dilemma in the pre-war years and are the most important pages in this gook. Finally, Chapter 5 deals with the crisis of July 1914 and the outbreak of war.
