This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1908 edition. Excerpt: ... lecture ii sensation and affection: the criteria of affection the psychology of feeling, as I said in the introduction to the preceding Lecture, is in a notoriously unsettled state. We have psychologists of the first rank who posit an elementary affective process alongside of sensation; we have ...
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This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1908 edition. Excerpt: ... lecture ii sensation and affection: the criteria of affection the psychology of feeling, as I said in the introduction to the preceding Lecture, is in a notoriously unsettled state. We have psychologists of the first rank who posit an elementary affective process alongside of sensation; we have psychologists of the first rank who deny the distinction. Wundt and Lipps stand over against Brentano and Stumpf.1 I propose, now, in the present hour, to examine the principal arguments that have been urged in favour of an independent feeling element, and the arguments that have been brought forward in reply. I shall use the term 'affection' for the elementary process in question, and for the sake of clearness I shall speak only of the qualities of pleasantness and unpleasantness. These, of course, are recognised by all psychologists alike, --by those who hold a plural as well as by those who hold a dual theory of affective processes at large. What we may call the gross reason, the obvious reason, for assuming an affective element is, I suppose, the gross and obvious difference between the intellectual processes of the adult mind, on the one hand, and the emotive processes, on the other. As thought differs from emotion, so must the element of thought, the sensation, differ from the element of emotion, the affection. Personally, I attach more weight to this argument than its formal expression might seem to warrant. I believe that the simple feelings--our experiences when we 'feel hungry, ' 'feel dizzy, ' 'feel tired, ' 'feel comfortable, ' 'feel poorly, ' 'feel firstrate'--represent a stage or level from which we ascend to the emotions; and that the emotions, again, represent a stage or level from which we descend to se
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