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Seller's Description:
Fair. Item in acceptable condition including possible liquid damage. As well answers may be filled in. May be missing DVDs, CDs, Access code, etc. 100%Money-Back Guarantee! Ship within 24 hours! !
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Near Fine in Very Good+ jacket. 8vo-over 7¾"-9¾" tall. Cloth. Near Fine/Very Good+. First Edition. 8vo-over 7¾"-9¾" tall. 335pp/maps. "An attempt to understand why the United States lost the Vietnam War. The author has identified an 'alogrithmic error' in United States strategy. This related to the Geneva accords on Laos in 1962. The United States agreed to the recognition of Laos as a neutral state. Within the following year they came to a tacit agreement with the North Vietnamese, by which North Vietnam agreed not to launch ground attacks against western Laos, if the United States did not launch ground attacks against the Laotian panhandle, that is the southern third of Laos.
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Near Fine in Near Fine jacket. 8vo-over 7¾"-9¾" tall. 335pp. links the role of Laos and the policy of incremenalism to provide important new insight into the failure of the United States in Vietnam. Incrementalism is the practice of reducing big choices into small bits each of which can be made singly without facing the big decision. Hannah concludes that incrementalism was the United States' standard military and political operation procedure throughout the Vietnam War, and that it was at the root of our failure. It was incrementalism which led President Kennedy and Averell Harriman in 1963 to accept a "tacit agreement" the Communist partition of Laos, whose neutralization they had negotiated with the Soviet Union in 1962. Clean.
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Very good, very good. 335, notes, index. In this penetrating new study, Norman Hannah links the role of Laos and the policy of incrementalism to provide important new insight into the failure of the United States in Vietnam.
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Seller's Description:
Near Fine in Near Fine jacket. Review Copy. 8vo-over 7¾"-9¾" tall. 335pp. links the role of Laos and the policy of incremenalism to provide important new insight into the failure of the United States in Vietnam. Incrementalism is the practice of reducing big choices into small bits each of which can be made singly without facing the big decision. Hannah concludes that incrementalism was the United States' standard military and political operation procedure throughout the Vietnam War, and that it was at the root of our failure. It was incrementalism which led President Kennedy and Averell Harriman in 1963 to accept a "tacit agreement" the Communist partition of Laos, whose neutralization they had negotiated with the Soviet Union in 1962. Clean.
