The American intelligence network, essentially left over from World War II and Vietnam, has evolved randomly since the postwar period. The authors warn that the intelligence issues that have stirred the U.S. in the past are trivial compared with the issues of today, and only a return to the basics will help the U.S. plan its steps with skill and foreknowledge.
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The American intelligence network, essentially left over from World War II and Vietnam, has evolved randomly since the postwar period. The authors warn that the intelligence issues that have stirred the U.S. in the past are trivial compared with the issues of today, and only a return to the basics will help the U.S. plan its steps with skill and foreknowledge.
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Good in Good jacket. xix, [1], 491, [1] pages. Footnotes. Notes. Bibliography. Index. DJ has some wear and soiling. Some yellow highlighting and marginal comment noted. Previous owner's address label on fep. Angelo M. Codevilla (born May 25, 1943) is an Italian-US professor emeritus of international relations at what is now the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University. He served as a U.S. Navy officer, a foreign service officer, and professional staff member of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate. He helped to conceive the technology programs that, in 1983, were relabeled the Strategic Defense Initiative. Codevilla's books and articles range from French and Italian politics to the thoughts of Machiavelli and Montesquieu to arms control, war, the technology of ballistic missile defenses, and a broad range of international topics. Articles by Codevilla have appeared in Commentary, Foreign Affairs, National Review, and The New Republic. His op-eds have appeared in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Post. He has also been published in Political Science Reviewer, Intercollegiate Review, and Politica. Derived from a Kirkus review: Intelligence gathering explained and critiqued by Codevilla. Statecraft works with information, and our intelligence community is not providing the relevant information: This is Codevilla's thesis, and in developing it he offers a balanced history of intelligence, as well as some criticisms of the US intelligence community. For those who wonder how the U-2 happened to be over Russia as Eisenhower was traveling to meet Khrushchev, why Cuba was considered ripe for the picking, who was minding the store when we entered Vietnam, or how a Soviet spy might re-defect while he's with his keepers, this is a satisfying study. As a senior staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence from 1977-85, Codevilla knows where some bodies are buried-but along with nifty bits, the author provides important historical context, defines the vocabulary of information and clarifies its types, and breaks down intelligence in a way that enables a reader to grasp what lies behind the squirmings of CIA men as they face Congress from time to time. Informative, and lightened by brisk, even breezy writing ("There is a difference between intelligence and voyeurism'')-but the tone removes any sense of urgency; in fact, one might see this study as a subtle apologia for agencies that sometimes act with little control.
