Preface. Three Puzzles in Frege's Theory of Truth; T. Baldwin. Truth and Sense; G. Segal. Frege and Chomsky: Sense and Psychologism; B. Smith. Meaning and the Third Realm; P. Kotatko. Putnam's Doctrine of Natural Kind Words and Frege's Doctrines of Sense, Reference and Extension: Can They Cohere? D. Wiggins. Concept-Reference and Kinds; A. Grayling. The Communication of First Person Thoughts; F. Recanati. Transparency, Sense and Self-Knowledge; T. Stoneham. The Sense and Reference of Evaluative Terms; C. Tappolet. The Next ...
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Preface. Three Puzzles in Frege's Theory of Truth; T. Baldwin. Truth and Sense; G. Segal. Frege and Chomsky: Sense and Psychologism; B. Smith. Meaning and the Third Realm; P. Kotatko. Putnam's Doctrine of Natural Kind Words and Frege's Doctrines of Sense, Reference and Extension: Can They Cohere? D. Wiggins. Concept-Reference and Kinds; A. Grayling. The Communication of First Person Thoughts; F. Recanati. Transparency, Sense and Self-Knowledge; T. Stoneham. The Sense and Reference of Evaluative Terms; C. Tappolet. The Next Best Thing to Sense in Begriffsschrift; P. Simons. Understanding Names; D. Owens. Why is Frege's Puzzle Still Puzzling? E. Corazza, J. Dokic. The Frege Puzzle One More Time; M. Hahn. The Neo-Fregean Argument; J. Biro. Index.
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