A great power's use of its military forces may be rendered ineffective or even counterproductive when there are no clear internationally recognizable limits on this use of force. Professor Myerson derives this conclusion from the basic observation that our ability to influence potential rivals depends on a balanced mix of threats and promises. Potential adversaries should believe that aggression will be punished, but such threats will be useless unless they also believe our promises that good behavior will be better ...
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A great power's use of its military forces may be rendered ineffective or even counterproductive when there are no clear internationally recognizable limits on this use of force. Professor Myerson derives this conclusion from the basic observation that our ability to influence potential rivals depends on a balanced mix of threats and promises. Potential adversaries should believe that aggression will be punished, but such threats will be useless unless they also believe our promises that good behavior will be better rewarded. A reputation for resolve makes threats credible, but a great power also needs a reputation for restraint, to make the promises credible as well. Thus, international restraints on a nation's use of military force may actually increase the effective influence of its military strength.
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Add this copy of Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: a Game to cart. $9.99, very good condition, Sold by GuthrieBooks rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Spring Branch, TX, UNITED STATES, published 2007 by Strategic Studies Institute, U.
Edition:
2007, Strategic Studies Institute U. S. Army War College
Add this copy of Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: a Game to cart. $36.04, good condition, Sold by Bonita rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Newport Coast, CA, UNITED STATES, published 2007 by Strategic Studies Institute, U.
Edition:
2007, Strategic Studies Institute U. S. Army War College
Add this copy of Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: a Game to cart. $41.69, good condition, Sold by Bonita rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Newport Coast, CA, UNITED STATES, published 2012 by Bibliogov.
Add this copy of Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: a Game to cart. $107.00, good condition, Sold by Ground Zero Books, Ltd. rated 4.0 out of 5 stars, ships from Silver Spring, MD, UNITED STATES, published 2007 by Strategic Studies Institute U. S. Army War College.
Edition:
2007, Strategic Studies Institute U. S. Army War College
Publisher:
Strategic Studies Institute U. S. Army War College
Published:
2007
Language:
English
Alibris ID:
13469940012
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Seller's Description:
Very good. Cover has slight wear and soiling. vi, 25, [1] p. Illustrations. Endnotes. This is one of the Advancing Strategic Thought series. From Wikipedia: "This monograph is a short nontechnical introduction to the use of game theory in the study of international relations, focusing is on the problem of deterrence against potential adversaries and aggressors. The author uses game models to provide a simple context where we can see more clearly the essential logic of strategic deterrence. Dr. Roger B. Myerson, winner of the 2007 Nobel Prize in Economics, is the Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago. Dr. Myerson is the author of two books and many professional articles on game theory, information economics, and economic analysis of political institutions. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Dr. Myerson was elected Vice President of the Econometric Society in 2006. Dr. Myerson holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University. The above information may not be current. It was current at the time when the individual worked for SSI or was published by SSI.
