A Smithsonian Top History Book of 2016 A Japan Times Best Book About Japan of 2016 A fascinating look at the twelve days leading up to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor--the warnings, clues and missteps--by a Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter. In Washington, DC, in late November 1941, admirals compose the most ominous message in Navy history to warn Hawaii of possible danger, but they write it too vaguely. They think precautions are being taken, but never check to see if they are. A key intelligence officer wants ...
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A Smithsonian Top History Book of 2016 A Japan Times Best Book About Japan of 2016 A fascinating look at the twelve days leading up to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor--the warnings, clues and missteps--by a Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter. In Washington, DC, in late November 1941, admirals compose the most ominous message in Navy history to warn Hawaii of possible danger, but they write it too vaguely. They think precautions are being taken, but never check to see if they are. A key intelligence officer wants more warnings sent, but he is on the losing end of a bureaucratic battle and can't get the message out. American sleuths have pierced Japan's most vital diplomatic code, and Washington believes it has a window on the enemy's soul--but it does not. In a small office at Pearl Harbor, overlooking the battleships at the heart of America's seafaring power, the Commander of the Pacific Fleet tries to figure out how much danger he really faces. His intelligence unit has lost track of Japan's biggest aircraft carriers, but assumes they are resting in a port far away. The admiral thinks Pearl is too shallow for torpedoes, so he never puts up a barrier. As he frets, a Japanese spy is counting the warships in the harbor and reporting to Tokyo. There were false assumptions, and racist ones: The Japanese aren't very good aviators and they don't have the nerve or the skill to attempt a strike so far from their home. There were misunderstandings, conflicting desires, painful choices. And there was a naval officer who, on his very first mission as captain of his very first ship, did exactly the right thing. His warning could have averted disaster, but his superiors reacted too leisurely. Japanese planes arrived moments later. Twomey's telescoping of the twelve days leading to the attack unravels the crucial characters and moments, and produces an edge-of-your seat drama with fascinating details about America at this moment in its history. By the end, the reader understands how assumption is the root of disaster, and how sometimes a gamble pays off.
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Add this copy of Countdown to Pearl Harbor: The Twelve Days to the to cart. $23.14, new condition, Sold by Ingram Customer Returns Center rated 5.0 out of 5 stars, ships from NV, USA, published 2017 by Simon & Schuster.
Although well composed and highly readable with an impressive collection of direct quotations, this book misses much of the real story of the Pearl Harbor attack. Admiral Kimmel is pictured as a most earnest and conscientious leader who may have been a bit more wary of the Japanese threat. Maybe so, but so should have Washington. The administration and military brass had much more information about the impending war that they willfully did not share with Adm. Kimmel. The intelligence, Magic, held many decisive clues to Japanese intentions that would certainly would have changed Adm. Kimmel's and Gen. Short's preparations. Even after Adm. Kimmel, in a face-to-face meeting with CNO Stark, demanded to have access to all intelligence and was assured by Stark that he would, no Magic intercepts were sent to Pearl Harbor. Was this intentional, or a fatal blunder by the CNO? It may have been both. Adm. Kimmel knew nothing of Magic-had never heard the term-until years after the event. Eventually, Stark was found culpable by a Naval Inquiry Board. Then there is the President. Clearly FDR wanted to be in the war, but would not be the initiator. He never made a decision that was politically risky in the least. Was placing the fleet at Pearl Harbor a deterrent, or he was it bait. Again there is no conclusive evidence of either, but arguments can be made for each. An FDR idea to send warships on a voyage toward Japan was rejected by advisers as too bold and risky. Its only accomplishment would have been to aggravate the potential enemy. Perhaps to get them to strike first? Commanding officers are responsible for the outcome of events involving their command. But their superiors are as responsible for providing them adequate support. Although material resources were wanting-the war in the Atlantic was an established priority-informational resources that were somewhat in abundance were denied Pearl Harbor. Was it to make sure Gen Short was not in position to attack the Japanese fleet on the chance that it would have been detected that Gen Marshall directed him to protect against sabotage, which meant collect all aircraft together and make them vulnerable targets and hard to scramble? With all that Washington knew through Magic intercepts, such a miscalculation seems hardly plausible. We will never know. But what we do know is that the treatment of Adm. Kimmel was clearly over the top. FDR's retaliation was in character for a vicious, disingenuous, secretive, charlatan, whom history has treated far too positively IMHO.
