In Blind over Cuba , David M. Barrett and Max Holland challenge the popular perception of the Kennedy administration's handling of the Soviet Union's surreptitious deployment of missiles in the Western Hemisphere.
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In Blind over Cuba , David M. Barrett and Max Holland challenge the popular perception of the Kennedy administration's handling of the Soviet Union's surreptitious deployment of missiles in the Western Hemisphere.
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Seller's Description:
Good. Gently used with minimal wear on the corners and cover. A few pages may contain light highlighting or writing but the text remains fully legible. Dust jacket may be missing and supplemental materials like CDs or codes may not be included. Could have library markings. Ships promptly!
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Good. Connecting readers with great books since 1972! Used textbooks may not include companion materials such as access codes, etc. May have some wear or writing/highlighting. We ship orders daily and Customer Service is our top priority!
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Seller's Description:
Very good in Very good jacket. x, [2], 210, [2] pages. DJ has minor edge wear and soiling. Includes Introduction, Acknowledgments, Maps. Illustrations. Notes, Bibliography, Index, and Appendix. Includes chapters on The Making of a "Photo Gap; " Obscuring the Photo Gap; The struggle over the Postmortems; Stonewalling the House; The Senate Steps In; Tensions within the Kennedy Administration: Fashioning a Unified Story; End of the Trail: The "Interim" Report; The Costs of Managed History. David M. Barrett (born c. 1951) is a professor of political science at Villanova University and author (along with Max Holland) of "Blind Over Cuba: The Photo Gap and the Missile Crisis", "The CIA and Congress: The Untold Story from Truman to Kennedy", ] Lyndon B. Johnson's Vietnam Papers, and Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and His Vietnam Advisers. Max Holland (born 1950) is an American journalist, author, and the editor of Washington Decoded. He had more than three decades of journalism experience; his articles have appeared in The Washington Post, The New York Times, Studies in Intelligence, the Journal of Cold War Studies. Holland's published books include: Leak: Why Mark Felt Became Deep Throat; The Kennedy Assassination Tapes: The White House Conversations of Lyndon B. Johnson Regarding the Assassination, the Warren Commission, and the Aftermath; The CEO Goes to Washington: Negotiating the Halls of Power; and When the Machine Stopped: A Cautionary Tale from Industrial America. In 2001, he won a Studies in Intelligence Award from the CIA, a first for a writer outside the U.S. government. n the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, questions persisted about how the potential cataclysm had been allowed to develop. A subsequent congressional investigation focused on what came to be known as the photo gap: five weeks during which intelligence-gathering flights over Cuba had been attenuated. In Blind over Cuba, David M. Barrett and Max Holland challenge the popular perception of the Kennedy administrations handling of the Soviet Union's surreptitious deployment of missiles in the Western Hemisphere. Rather than epitomizing it as a masterpiece of crisis management by policy makers and the administration, Barrett and Holland make the case that the affair was, in fact, a close call stemming directly from decisions made in a climate of deep distrust between key administration officials and the intelligence community. Because of White House and State Department fears of another U-2 incident (the infamous 1960 Soviet downing of an American U-2 spy plane), the CIA was not permitted to send surveillance aircraft on prolonged flights over Cuban airspace for many weeks, from late August through early October. Events proved that this was precisely the time when the Soviets were secretly deploying missiles in Cuba. When Director of Central Intelligence John McCone forcefully pointed out that this decision had led to a dangerous void in intelligence collection, the president authorized one U-2 flight directly over western Cuba thereby averting disaster, as the surveillance detected the Soviet missiles shortly before they became operational. The Kennedy administration recognized that their failure to gather intelligence was politically explosive, and their subsequent efforts to influence the perception of events form the focus for this study. Using recently declassified documents, secondary materials, and interviews with several key participants, Barrett and Holland weave a story of intra-agency conflict, suspicion, and discord that undermined intelligence-gathering, adversely affected internal postmortems conducted after the crisis peaked, and resulted in keeping Congress and the public in the dark about what really happened. Fifty years after the crisis that brought the superpowers to the brink, Blind over Cuba: The Photo Gap and the Missile Crisis offers a new chapter in our understanding of that pivotal event, the tensions inside the US government...
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Seller's Description:
New. Sewn binding. Cloth over boards. With dust jacket. 210 p. Contains: Illustrations, black & white, Maps. Foreign Relations and the Presidency (Hardcover), 11.
