The decision announced by John F. Kennedy on May 25, 1961, initiating the expedition to the moon, is now documented in full for future students of history. To John Logsdon, whose approach is that of a political scientist examining the influence of men and events on the decision-making process, the decision to land a man on the moon "before this decade is out" was wholly political rather than military, although overtones of implied defense were useful in obtaining congressional support. Moreover, he notes it was made without ...
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The decision announced by John F. Kennedy on May 25, 1961, initiating the expedition to the moon, is now documented in full for future students of history. To John Logsdon, whose approach is that of a political scientist examining the influence of men and events on the decision-making process, the decision to land a man on the moon "before this decade is out" was wholly political rather than military, although overtones of implied defense were useful in obtaining congressional support. Moreover, he notes it was made without the support of the scientific community, although their previous research efforts were expected partially to offset this deterrent.Although the success of the Russian manned orbit and the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs invasion certainly influenced the timing, in the author's interpretation the Kennedy decision manages to escape the narrow definition of a public relations exhibition. In Kennedy's view, he emphasizes, the security of the country itself was inseparably linked to a position of prestige in world opinion. Nor was he a particular enthusiast of space exploration for its own rewards. As he remarked to one of his advisors, "If you had a scientific spectacular on this earth that would be more useful--say desalting the ocean--or something just as dramatic and convincing as space, then we would do "that.""The thoroughness of this book as a historical record is evident throughout. NASA historical records and government documents not previously released, including several Presidential papers, are used in the analysis, and the author weaves these records together with subtleties of opinion from interviews with NASA officials and such Kennedy advisors as Theodore Sorenson, McGeorge Bundy, David Bell, and Jerome Wiesner.
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Seller's Description:
Very good in Good jacket. [18], 187, [1] pages. Footnotes. Index. DJ has some wear, tears, and soiling. Includes Preface; Introduction: A Great New American Enterprise; Part 1: How the Decision was Made; Origins of United States Policy; Part 2: Planning for a Lunar Journey; Part 3; Steps Toward a Decision; Part 4 "We Should Go to the Moon"; Part II; Analysis and Evaluation of the Decision; Part 5: Space Policy and the National Interest; Part 6: The Lessons of Apollo, and Index (page 183-187). John Logsdon is the founder of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University. In 2003, Logsdon was a member of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. He is a former member of the NASA Advisory Council. Logsdon is a professor emeritus of political science and international affairs at GW. He held the first Chair in Space History at the National Air and Space Museum and in 2008-2009 was Charles A. Lindbergh Chair in Aerospace History at that museum. He is author of The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest. The International Astronautical Federation awarded Logsdon the 2013 Frank J. Malina Astronautics Medal for outstanding contributions. Logsdon is a recipient of the Exceptional Public Service, Distinguished Public Service, and Public Service Medals from NASA and the 2005 John F. Kennedy Astronautics Award from the American Astronautical Society. He is a Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics and the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and a member of the International Academy of Astronautics. The decision announced by John F. Kennedy on May 25, 1961, initiating the expedition to the moon, is now documented in full for future students of history. To John Logsdon, whose approach is that of a political scientist examining the influence of men and events on the decision-making process, the decision to land a man on the moon "before this decade is out" was wholly political rather than military, although overtones of implied defense were useful in obtaining congressional support. Moreover, he notes it was made without the support of the scientific community, although their previous research efforts were expected partially to offset this deterrent. Although the success of the Russian manned orbit and the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs invasion certainly influenced the timing, in the author's interpretation the Kennedy decision manages to escape the narrow definition of a public relations exhibition. In Kennedy's view, he emphasizes, the security of the country itself was inseparably linked to a position of prestige in world opinion. Nor was he a particular enthusiast of space exploration for its own rewards. As he remarked to one of his advisors, "If you had a scientific spectacular on this earth that would be more useful-say desalting the ocean-or something just as dramatic and convincing as space, then we would do that." The thoroughness of this book as a historical record is evident throughout. NASA historical records and government documents not previously released, including several Presidential papers, are used in the analysis, and the author weaves these records together with subtleties of opinion from interviews with NASA officials and such Kennedy advisors as Theodore Sorenson, McGeorge Bundy, David Bell, and Jerome Wiesner.
